Case studies · the record structure on real episodes
Four sanction episodes, resolved the way the database will resolve all of them.
Each episode below is mapped onto the target record structure — sanction, year, targeted country, affected SIC-4 industries, affected HS-4 product categories, and the direction of each restriction. The episodes span eras and mechanism types: secondary financial sanctions, sectoral non-blocking directives, entity-list export controls, and blocking of a state enterprise.
Reading these tables
Inflow means goods, capital, or technology movinginto the sanctioned country are restricted (export controls, financing bans); outflow means the country’s exports moving out are restricted (import bans, purchaser-side secondary sanctions). SIC-4 and HS-4 assignments are illustrative analytical mappings made by this project — the legal instruments themselves speak in activities, sector determinations, and controlled-item lists. Rows labeled induced record measured trade consequences rather than the operative legal command. Facts marked as program evidence come from the project’s own hashed, source-registered research packages; Federal Register citations and quantified impacts were re-verified against the Federal Register API and the cited public sources in August 2026.
Case 01 · Iran · 2010–2016 · re-imposed 2018
CISADA and the secondary-sanctions architecture
CISADA, Pub. L. 111-195 (2010) · Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 561, 75 FR 49836 · NDAA FY2012 §1245, 22 U.S.C. §8513a · 31 C.F.R. pt. 560 · JPOA relief, 79 FR 4522
The 2010–2012 Iran measures are the canonical case of secondary sanctions: rather than only barring U.S. persons, CISADA and NDAA §1245 threatened third-country banks and energy traders with loss of U.S. correspondent-account access if they dealt with Iran’s financial and petroleum sectors. The economic channel therefore ran through foreign intermediaries — European and Asian refiners, insurers, and banks — cutting Iran’s crude exports and financial connectivity without a multilateral embargo. The episode also supplies textbook lifecycle events: temporary suspension under the JPOA (2014), broad relief under the JCPOA (2016), and re-imposition in 2018.
| Affected dimension | Industry (SIC-4) | Product (HS-4) | Direction | Mechanism |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crude oil exports | 1311 — Crude petroleum and natural gas | 2709 — Petroleum oils, crude | Outflow | Secondary sanction on purchasers / CBI transactions (NDAA §1245) |
| Refined-petroleum supply to Iran | 2911 — Petroleum refining | 2710 — Petroleum oils, refined | Inflow | Secondary sanction on suppliers of refined products (CISADA §102) |
| Banking and correspondent access | 6022 / 6081 — Banks; foreign bank branches | n/a — financial services | Inflow (settlement access denied) | Correspondent-account prohibition (31 C.F.R. §561.201) |
| Upstream energy investment and equipment | 3533 — Oil and gas field machinery | 8431 — Parts for boring/sinking machinery | Inflow | Investment-threshold sanctions (ISA as amended); export ban (31 C.F.R. pt. 560) |
| Petrochemicals | 2869 — Industrial organic chemicals | 2902 — Cyclic hydrocarbons | Outflow | Secondary sanctions on petrochemical purchases (EO 13622 era) |
Measured impact. Iran’s crude and condensate exports fell from ~2.5 million b/d (2011) to ~1.1 million b/d (first nine months of 2013); EIA attributes most of the decline to tightened U.S./EU sanctions.
Measured impact. Iran’s net oil-export revenue dropped from $95 billion (2011) to an estimated $69 billion (2012) (EIA).
Program evidence base: both research seats’ source registries hold hashed captures of 31 C.F.R. 560/561, 22 U.S.C. §8513a, the §1245 petroleum determinations, and the JPOA relief notice; the two-consequence structure of §561.201 is analyzed in the cross-seat synthesis. Federal Register citations and EIA figures re-verified externally, August 2026.
Case 02 · Russia · 2014–present · escalation 2022
Crimea sectoral sanctions, escalated to comprehensive measures
EO 13660/13661/13662 (79 FR 13493, 15535, 16169) · SSI Directives 1–4 (79 FR 63021) · BIS deepwater/Arctic/shale rule, 79 FR 45675 · EO 14024, 14066, 14068, 14071 (2021–22) · G7 oil price cap (2022)
The 2014 Russia program invented the sectoral, non-blocking mechanism: listed banks and energy firms were not frozen out entirely, but U.S. persons could not provide them new equity or debt beyond specified maturity tenors, and BIS barred exports of technology for frontier oil extraction — targeting Russia’s future production capacity and refinancing rather than current trade. After February 2022 the same country moved to near-comprehensive treatment: blocking of major banks, a U.S. energy-import ban, broad export controls including a Russia foreign-direct-product rule, and the G7 oil price cap. One target country thus spans the full mechanism spectrum.
| Affected dimension | Industry (SIC-4) | Product (HS-4) | Direction | Mechanism |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Frontier oil-extraction technology | 3533 — Oil and gas field machinery | 8430 / 8431 — Boring machinery and parts; 7304 — Seamless pipes and casing | Inflow | Export control, presumption of denial (79 FR 45675; Directive 4) |
| Bank refinancing | 6021 / 6022 — Commercial banks | n/a — financial services | Inflow (new capital denied) | Sectoral non-blocking restriction — Directive 1 (new debt and equity tenors) |
| Energy-firm financing | 1311 — Crude petroleum and natural gas | n/a — financial services | Inflow | Sectoral restriction — Directive 2 |
| Defense-firm financing | 3489 — Ordnance and accessories, NEC | n/a — financial services | Inflow | Sectoral restriction — Directive 3 |
| Energy exports (2022) | 1311 / 2911 — Crude petroleum; refining | 2709 / 2710 / 2701 / 2711 — Crude, refined products, coal, gas | Outflow | U.S. import ban (EO 14066); G7 price cap via services prohibition |
| Advanced technology inputs (2022) | 3674 — Semiconductors | 8542 — Integrated circuits | Inflow | Export controls incl. Russia foreign-direct-product rule |
Measured impact. Firm-level evidence on the 2014-era targeted sanctions: a sanctioned Russian company lost on average roughly one-quarter of operating revenue, over half of asset value, and about one-third of employees relative to non-targeted peers (Ahn & Ludema, European Economic Review 2020).
Measured impact. The same study estimates state bailouts of “strategic” firms absorbed about 45% of the total sanction cost during 2014–2016.
Program evidence base: hashed Federal Register PDFs of EO 14024 and EO 14068 and the SSI action record (79 FR 63021) sit in the research seats’ registries; both seats independently reconstructed the Directive 1–4 tenor structure, recorded in the cross-seat synthesis. External citations re-verified against the Federal Register API, August 2026.
Case 03 · China · 2019–present
Entity List and semiconductor export controls
Huawei Entity List addition, 84 FR 22961 (2019) · Foreign-direct-product rules, 85 FR 29849 and 85 FR 51596 (2020) · Advanced-computing and semiconductor controls, 87 FR 62186 (Oct. 2022) · 15 C.F.R. pt. 744
The China episode is the paradigm of export-control-based statecraft rather than asset blocking. The 2019 Huawei Entity List action imposed a license requirement with a policy of denial on U.S.-origin items; because Huawei could still buy foreign-made chips, BIS extended jurisdiction in 2020 through the foreign-direct-product rule to semiconductors made abroad with U.S. software or equipment — an extraterritorial reach structurally similar to secondary sanctions. The October 2022 rule generalized the approach from named entities to the entire Chinese advanced-computing sector. The legal restriction is almost entirely inflow (inputs denied), with measurable induced contraction in downstream electronics exports.
| Affected dimension | Industry (SIC-4) | Product (HS-4) | Direction | Mechanism |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Advanced logic and memory chips | 3674 — Semiconductors and related devices | 8542 / 8541 — Integrated circuits; semiconductor devices | Inflow | Entity-list license requirement + foreign-direct-product rule |
| Semiconductor manufacturing equipment | 3559 — Special industry machinery, NEC | 8486 — Machines for semiconductor manufacture | Inflow | Destination-wide license requirement (87 FR 62186) |
| Advanced computing / supercomputers | 3571 — Electronic computers | 8471 — Automatic data-processing machines | Inflow | End-use and item controls (87 FR 62186) |
| EDA software and U.S.-person services | 7372 — Prepackaged software | n/a — software and services | Inflow | U.S.-person activity restrictions; FDPR leverage over foreign fabs |
| Telecom equipment and smartphones | 3661 / 3663 — Telephone and communications equipment | 8517 — Telephones and network apparatus | Outflow (induced, not a legal ban) | Export contraction caused by upstream chip denial |
Measured impact. Huawei’s 2021 revenue fell 28.6% year-on-year — its first recorded annual decline — with the consumer division down nearly 50%, attributed primarily to U.S. export restrictions.
Measured impact. The May 2019 action listed Huawei plus 68 non-U.S. affiliates across 26 countries in a single rule — one “sanction event” carrying a multi-jurisdiction, multi-entity structure.
Program evidence base: the Codex seat’s primary-law analysis adjudicates targeted Entity List controls as economic sanctions within the ratified construct; its registry holds the 15 C.F.R. pt. 744 snapshot and a mixed 2021 Entity List action; the Claude seat’s construct carries the foreign-direct-product scope distinction. All four Federal Register rules re-verified externally, August 2026.
Case 04 · Venezuela · 2017–present · blocking from 2019
PdVSA designation and the oil-sector blocking program
EO 13808, 82 FR 41155 (2017) · EO 13850, 83 FR 55243 (2018) · PdVSA SDN designation with EO 13857, 84 FR 509 (Jan. 2019) · EO 13884, 84 FR 38843 (Aug. 2019)
Venezuela shows how a single-entity blocking action can function as a country-level trade sanction when the entity is a state oil monopoly. The January 2019 designation of PdVSA froze its U.S. assets (including the Citgo downstream network), barred U.S. persons from buying its crude or supplying it diluents, and swept in its subsidiaries through the 50-percent rule. U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude — roughly 500,000 b/d in 2018 — went to zero within weeks. Because Venezuelan heavy crude requires imported naphtha diluent and U.S. refining outlets, one blocking measure produced simultaneous inflow and outflow restrictions: a compact, well-identified case for the index.
| Affected dimension | Industry (SIC-4) | Product (HS-4) | Direction | Mechanism |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crude oil exports to the U.S. | 1311 — Crude petroleum and natural gas | 2709 — Petroleum oils, crude | Outflow | SDN blocking of PdVSA (de facto import ban; wind-down licenses) |
| Diluent (naphtha) supply | 2911 — Petroleum refining | 2710 — Petroleum oils, refined | Inflow | Blocking — U.S. persons barred from exporting diluents to PdVSA |
| Downstream U.S. assets (Citgo) | 2911 — Petroleum refining | n/a — asset freeze | n/a — financial | Asset freeze; control of PdVSA’s U.S. property |
| Sovereign and PdVSA finance | 6021 — Commercial banks (creditor exposure) | n/a — financial services | Inflow (new capital denied) | New debt/equity prohibition (EO 13808) |
| Oilfield services and equipment | 1389 — Oil and gas field services, NEC | 8431 — Parts for boring/sinking machinery | Inflow | Follow-on designations of service and shipping providers |
Measured impact. Venezuelan crude production fell from ~1.2 million b/d in January 2019 to 830,000 b/d by April 2019 — the lowest since the 2003 national strike — with EIA naming the PdVSA sanctions among the principal causes; U.S. imports fell to zero.
Measured impact. At designation, the U.S. Treasury estimated the action would block $7 billion in PdVSA assets and deny over $11 billion in export proceeds over the following year.
Program evidence base: the Codex seat’s registry holds a hashed capture of OFAC’s January 28, 2019 designation-day action page and the surrounding 2018–2019 Venezuela action series; the synthesis documents the “General License 8” website-only-publication finding. EIA, CRS, and Treasury figures re-verified externally, August 2026.
What the episodes teach the schema
Cross-episode observations
- Direction is mechanism-specific, not episode-specific
Every episode contains both inflow and outflow components — Iran’s refined-product inflow ban beside its crude outflow curtailment; Venezuela’s diluent inflow bar beside its crude outflow block. The direction field must attach to the measure component, not the episode.
- Financial channels have no HS code
Correspondent-account, debt-tenor, and asset-freeze components map to SIC-4 but not to HS-4. The schema carries an explicit not-applicable value for services rather than forcing a product code.
- Secondary sanctions and the foreign-direct-product rule are one structural move
Both extend U.S. restriction to third-country transactions — one through financial-access threats, one through technology jurisdiction. Both research seats reached this conclusion independently; the construct records it in the scope dimension.
- Induced effects must be labeled
China’s telephone-equipment export contraction is a measured consequence of an inflow restriction, not an outflow prohibition. Conflating legal direction with induced direction would corrupt the variable, so induced rows are labeled as such.